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I. Introduction
The Issue
Technology has become one of the major issues in U.S.-Japan relations. As Japan
acquires greater competitiveness in world-class technologies, the U.S. has started to
worry about the implications this will have for its future economy. Additionally, Japan's
increasing technological strength has started to affect its security relationship with the
U.S. This is become some of the advanced technologies in which Japan has gained an
edge are dual use in nature; that is, they are useful for military as well as commercial
purposes. The most significant problem emerging from the dual-use nature of Japanese
technology is U.S. dependency on Japanese suppliers for military components. This
means an increasing vulnerability of the U.S. security position, as more components used
in U.S.-made weapons are produced in Japan. Hereinafter, this problem will be referred
to as the "dependency problem."
It is worrisome that this problem is causing rising tension between the U.S. and
Japan. On the U.S. side, there are those who are overly concerned about the
vulnerability of U.S. weapons systems and advocate technonationalism through
protectionist measures. On the Japanese side, as Shintaro Ishihara argues in The Japan
That Can Say No. Japan could change the world's military balance by favoring the USSR
over the U.S. in its semiconductor supply endeavors. This argument, however, may well
be based on overconfidence concerning Japan's technological prowess.l
These overreactions are potentially dangerous for the future of U.S.-Japan
relations. For this reason, a fuller analysis of the dependency problem should be
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undertaken, and appropriate actions initiated by both the U.S. and Japan. If
overreactions continue on both sides of the Pacific and if resultant friction emerges, a
very complex issue could arise between the two nations in view of both the economic and
security implications for their bilateral relationship.
Trend of Dependency
Although the dependency problem certainly has important implications for U.S.-
Japan relations, it is difficult to determine the exact degree to which U.S. high-tech
weapons incorporate Japanese electronic components in their systems. This is because
the Department of Defense keeps statistics only for prime contractors, not for
subcontractors or parts suppliers. There are, however, two methods of inferring the
degree of dependency.
The first is to check the actual contents of existing weapons, either by breaking up
or tracing sources of supplies. With the HARM missile, the Mark 48 torpedo and the
Verdin Communication Device, for instance, a three-year tracing survey by the Navy and
the Department of Commerce found, after checking 14,000 subcontractors, that about
20% of the components are made abroad.2 This kind of survey, of course, cannot clarify
the full extent of the dependency problem, but it provides a clue to determining it.
The second method is to estimate from trends in nonmilitary markets, where
more data are available. If it is shown that the majority of dual-use components for
commercial applications in the U.S. are supplied by foreign companies, there is a strong
possibility that military markets rely on these dual-use components as well. A typical
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example of this is semiconductor materials. Domestically produced semiconductor
materials, such as silicon wafers, sputter targets and ceramic packages, account for only
5% of the total supply in the U.S., suggesting that the military sector is similarly
dependent on foreign products.3
As seen in the Gulf War, the main U.S. high-tech weapons actually in use now are
those that were made in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the Japanese electronics
industry was not so competitive. In addition, in the case of semiconductors, military chips
typically lag three to five years behind commercial ones.4 In view of these factors, it is
probable that Japanese electronics components, especially semiconductors, are not widely
used at present in U.S. high-tech weapons systems.
Regardless of the actual degree of dependency at the moment, though, the
important point is that Japanese electronics components will be used more extensively
from now on because U.S. weapons will start to use those components made in the late
1980s, when Japanese companies were competitive.
There are still other reasons to believe that Japanese dual-use components will be
used more extensively in U.S. weapons systems in the near future.
First, the effectiveness of high-tech weapons was proven in actual battle during
the Gulf War, and this will lead to the further electronicization of weapons. In 1988,
36% of the purchases and 42% of the R&D expenses incurred by the Department of
Defense were electronics-related. These figures are expected to increase in the future.5
Second,; the Gulf War also showed that high-tech weapons themselves are
becoming very expensive, and, unless effective cost-cutting is undertaken, the U.S. will be
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able to afford fewer and fewer weapons. This development comes in conjunction with the
likelihood of cuts in the defense budget. One way to deal with this situation to substitute
dual-use components for military-specific components, which are much more expensive.
These trends point to the likelihood that Japanese dual-use electronic components
will be incorporated into U.S. weapon systems at an increasing rate. Consequently, the
dependency problem will become an even more important topic in U.S.-Japan relations
in the near future. This is the reason that both the U.S. and Japan should start now to
seek ways of approaching the dependency problem.
In this paper, I will present some possible solutions to the dependency problem
aimed at the private sector. It is important for the Japanese private sector, which usually
has little interest in military affairs, to take the initiative. This is because these
companies actually possess the important dual-use technologies. I will devote the next
section to summarizing the arguments in both countries concerning the dependency
problem. I will also point out the possibilities for overreaction on both sides. In the third
section, I will present an analysis of the dependency problem. In the fourth, I will present
three policy recommendations.
II. Opinions in the U.S. and Japan
Unfortunately, there are wide perception gaps between the two countries. The
arguments on both sides are outlined below.
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The U.S.
The dependency problem started to gain attention in the U.S. in the late 1970s. In
1980, the Defense Industrial Base Panel of the Committee on Armed Services published
a report that showed concern about the increasing dependency on foreign sources "for
critical raw materials as well as for some specialized components needed in military
equipment." The report also warned of the increasing competitiveness of Japanese
semiconductor manufacturers. 6 That same year, Jacques Gansler published a book on
the U.S. defense industry and, in it, he mentioned the dependency problem. 7
The concern regarding the dependency on Japanese electronic components
became particularly strong in the latter half of the 1980s, and a number of reports were
published on the topic. These reports were written by governmental agencies,
congressional committees, university institutes and private think tanks, and they take
highly diverse views. Below, I will divide these views into four categories and summarize
each. Since it is difficult to discuss at length the detailed differences among all of the
reports, I believe that categorization will be useful for clarifying the substance of the
dependency arguments.
1) The argument that there is no serious vulnerability arising from dependency
No report based on this argument has been written. There are, however, those
who argue this position. In general, representatives of prime contractors are said to take
this view. The argument, in the case of semiconductors, is as follows: Although
semiconductors are critical components, they are only a small part of military systems. In
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addition, truly critical semiconductors are only a small part of the total, and prime
contractors could produce these critical semiconductors in-house, if needed. Therefore,
the argument goes, there would not be any serious vulnerability problem, even if there
was reliance on commodity-type semiconductors from overseas suppliers.8
2) The argument for procurement of critical components from U.S. suppliers and
less important ones from Japanese suppliers
The most important report taking this position is the one written by the Northeast
Asia-United States Forum on International Policy at Stanford University. 9 The
argument in this report is that Japan is an ally of the United States; therefore, there
should be no serious concern about Japanese companies supplying electronic components
to U.S. prime contractors and subcontractors. Under such an arrangement, the U.S.
could even take advantage of Japanese electronics technology. Since there is uncertainty
involved in the technology transfer mechanism, however, the U.S. should maintain the
capability to produce only the truly critical components.
The report warns that, if the U.S. tries to protect its ability to produce critical
parts, this might lean towards protectionism. Therefore, the U.S. should try to preserve
its ability to produce only the truly critical components and seek to avoid broad
government intervention.
A similar attitude, emphasizing technology transfer and cooperation with Japan
(in both military-specific and dual-use technologies), can be found in reports by the
6
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National Research Council and by the Defense Science Board on technology
cooperation.10
3) The argument favoring industrial policy
This position favors broader U.S. government intervention than argument 2) and
supports industrial policy to protect strategic industries. A typical argument of this type
can be found in a report written by the Defense Science Board on semiconductor
dependency.! The main thrust of the report is that U.S. military forces depend
heavily on technological superiority and that electronics--especially semiconductor--
technology is essential for maintaining that superiority. It is, therefore, unacceptable for
the U.S. military to rely on foreign sources for state-of-the-art technology. To maintain a
dominant position, this argument goes, U.S. industry should lead in commercial markets
as well, due to the dual-use nature of military technology. It suggests the adoption of a
de facto industrial policy to achieve this objective.
Another difference between this argument and argument 2) is that this approach
tends to view Japan as a strong competitor rather than a cooperating colleague. This is
understandable because, in order to encourage the government to adopt an industrial
policy, it is politically more expedient to view Japan as threatening to U.S. strategic
industries.
7
IIYIII·PPI·lsPPII·--··-··---·
4) The argument for managed competition
Michael Borrus suggests the following approach to revitalizing the U.S.
semiconductor industry and acquiring national security as well as economic
competitiveness.12 He argues that the U.S. government should negotiate a five-year
restraint on investment in new chip production capacity by Japanese producers, while the
U.S. should grant special accelerated depreciation for U.S. producers so that they can
increase their investment in production capacity.
If these measures were adopted, U.S. producers would have an opportunity to
increase their share of the semiconductor market. Even if these measures did not
succeed, Borrus has an alternative policy: to encourage foreign direct investment and
have "U.S. policy rather than Japanese strategy" be adopted in the U.S. He argues that
this second-best policy would contribute to insuring U.S. national security and
strengthening the U.S. economy. Clearly, this approach is suggesting abandoning free
trade in the electronics sector and adopting managed competition to protect U.S.
interests.
Japan
Compared to the situation in the U.S., where the dependency problem draws wide
attention and a number of reports have been written, in Japan, although the problem is
widely recognized, it has not generated serious discussion or detailed analysis.
One reason for this is that the dependency problem is a problem for the U.S.;
Japan is only indirectly influenced. In addition, due to the dual-use nature of the
8
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technology, once Japanese electronics manufacturers supply components to U.S.
companies, they don't know whether the products are used for commercial or military
purposes. Since these Japanese manufacturers are afraid of being criticized by the media
or the opposition parties on the grounds that the components they produce are used in
weapons, they try to avoid discussing the issue openly.
However, the dependency problem attracted considerable attention during the
Gulf War. The fact that U.S. high-tech weapons, weapons that were so effective, actually
contained Japanese electronics components was widely mentioned in the media. Because
of this, arguments about the dependency problem began to emerge in the press. They
can be summarized as follows.
1) The argument that emphasizes technological excellence in Japan 13
This argument claims that the Gulf War proved the excellence of Japanese high
technologies; U.S. high-tech weapons used such Japanese-made components as
semiconductors and charged coupled devices, without which they would not have
functioned so well. Supporters of this argument, therefore, believe that Japan aided the
Gulf War effort from a technological standpoint. In addition, they claim that the high
quality and reliability of Japanese dual-use technology was indirectly proven through the
Gulf War.
9
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2) The argument that emphasizes pacifismR
Japan imposes strong controls over weapons exports through its Three Principles
on Arms Export, which prohibits shipping of weapons to: 1) communist bloc countries, 2)
countries subject to embargoes on arms export under United Nations Security Council
resolutions, and 3) countries engaged in or likely to be engaged in international conflicts.
Japanese electronics manufacturers, however, indirectly supply components to U.S. high-
tech weapons. Therefore, supporters of this argument say, the Three Principles have
become meaningless. In addition, they warn of increasing pressure from the U.S. to
transfer Japanese high technology to the U.S. military.
Worrisome Gap Between the Arguments
Neither of the Japanese arguments grasps the substance of the dependency
problem. Instead, they emphasize the excellence of Japanese technology and the
philosophy of pacifism, respectively. This is worrisome because, if Japan does not grasp
the substance of the problem and continues to avoid serious discussion of and
involvement with it, the possibility of overreaction in the U.S. will increase.
At present, the U.S. position is believed to be swinging between arguments 2) and
3); that is, even though there is a move, especially in Congress, toward nurturing
strategic industries, an obvious industrial policy approach is strongly opposed by the
administration. If Japan continues to be uncooperative towards the U.S. with regard to
the dependency problem, this will push the U.S. toward argument 3). This is because, if
Japan is judged to be an unreliable ally as a result of its uncooperative attitude towards
10
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the dependency problem, this will increase U.S. incentives to adopt a policy of protecting
its strategic industries.
III. Analysis
Differences Between the U.S. and Japan in the Backgrounds of Electronics
Development
One of the main reasons for the large gap between the U.S. and Japanese
arguments concerning the dependency problem accrues from the fact that the two
countries faced totally different environments surrounding the electronics industry during
the early stages of its development. Figure 1 illustrates this point. In the figure, the
vertical axis shows the level of national security related to electronics technology. If a
country has domestically owned R&D and manufacturing facilities for electronics
components within its own borders, its vulnerability to shortage of electronics supplies in
a crisis is reduced; therefore, its security position is strengthened. On the other hand, if
ownership and the location of these facilities are foreign, the country's security position is
weakened.
The horizontal axis shows the economic opportunity cost incurred by the
commercial sector in shifting resources to the military sector. Therefore, this figure shows
the relationship between the level of security and economic cost incurred by the level of
security in terms of electronics technology.
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First, let's look at the U.S. The U.S. security position was ideal in terms of
electronics technology during the period from World War II to the mid-1960s. The
superior level of U.S. electronics technology remained unchallenged throughout the
globe, and weapons that embodied advanced electronics technology were made by U.S.-
owned companies in manufacturing facilities located in the U.S. No dependency problem
existed during this period.
The U.S. did, however, pay an economic security cost to establish and maintain
this position; the U.S. government spent a large amount of its R&D funds for military
purposes. On average, for example, 54% of the government's R&D funds were
earmarked for military- and space-related purposes during the period from 1955 to
1965.15 If a larger budget had been allocated for commercial purposes, development
in that sector would have been more rapid. This is because it is more efficient to spend
R&D dollars directly in the commercial sector rather than wait for spin-off technology
from the military.
After World War II, the U.S. needed to strengthen her security position vis-a-vis
the USSR, even though this was costly. In any case, the U.S. could afford to do this
because of the strength of her economy at the time. Therefore, the U.S.
started in the upper left of Figure 1, a combination of strong security and high economic
cost.
This started to change in the 1970s, as the relative economic position of the U.S.
began to decline. Fiscal and trade deficits became particularly acute problems for the
U.S. in the 1980s. Therefore, the U.S. could not afford to strengthen her security position
12
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at the expense of her economy. In other words, although security issues were significant
in U.S. policymaking, economic issues were a significant constraint. Therefore, the U.S. is
believed to have moved to the lower left of Figure 1, requiring it to maintain a strong
security position while cutting costs.
The development of the electronics industry in Japan started differently. There,
the only purpose of developing electronics technology was to gain commercial
competitiveness by catching up with the U.S., i.e., purely economic. Therefore, economic
efficiency was the most important consideration in developing electronics technologies.
Japan did not need to reduce economic efficiency by shifting precious resources to
military ends, and she did not show a strong interest in the military implications of
electronics technologies. This was probably a rational choice for Japan because its
security position was assured by the security treaty with the U.S. Thus, Japan's
development of electronics technology started in the lower-right-hand quadrant of Figure
1, i.e., a combination of a weak security position and low spending.
Japan's position also started to change in the 1970s. The security aspects of
Japanese electronics technology became more important with its rapid advance to world
level. This advance is reflected in the fact that U.S. high-tech weapons started to
incorporate Japanese-made electronics components. This did not mean, however, that
Japan was trying to gain world leadership by strengthening her military power using her
electronics technology. In the postwar period, Japan has placed more emphasis on her
economic role in international affairs and has minimized any military aspects. Thus,
Japan has been unwilling to sacrifice economic efficiency for the military potential of
13
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electronics technology. In Figure 1, then, Japan moved from the lower right to the lower
left quadrant, maintaining an emphasis on economic efficiency while recognizing the
security aspects of electronics technology and using it properly for her security ends.
Both countries, thus, have moved into the lower left quadrant of Figure 1, where
they have similar interests in a strong security position and low spending. Since the U.S.
and Japan are allies, technological cooperation between them in the military field by
sharing technologies in which they have comparative advantages should be mutually
beneficial. This kind of cooperation, however, has not advanced smoothly. One important
reason for this is that neither country fully realizes its current position in relation to
national security and spending and sometimes try to behave as if they were in their
original position.
The U.S. was originally in a position where it could strengthen its security without
many economic constraints. Although it is now prohibitive to return to the original
security position (R&D, manufacturing and ownership all stay within the U.S.), there are
still some advocates of technonationalism who would like to see this happen.
For her part, Japan behaves like she is still in the lower- right-hand quadrant of
Figure 1, where she can ignore the security aspects of electronics technology. Although
technological advancement has started to attach security implications to the technologies,
Japan still tends to ignore this and look only at the economic implications. This is typical
of Japanese electronics manufacturers, and one reason for this is that these
manufacturers' technological roots are purely commercial.
14
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In conclusion, one of the major reasons for the large gap between the U.S. and
Japanese arguments is the difference in the backgrounds surrounding the early stages of
electronics technologies in the two countries. In order to make military-technological
cooperation between the two nations smoother and more beneficial, it is necessary for
both of them to realize that their current positions are different from their original ones.
Two layers of cooperation
It is important to distinguish two kinds of military technological cooperation
between the U.S. and Japan. Figure 2 illustrates this. The upper part of the figure shows
the prime contractors and subcontractors in the U.S. and Japan, among whom mainly
military-specific technologies are exchanged or transferred. On the legal side, the Three
Principles on Arms Exports are applied to technology transfer. Although the Principles
were relaxed in 1983 and the transfer of military technology to the U.S. was approved as
an exception, various legal restrictions still exist. Codevelopment of the FSX is a typical
project in this category of military relations.
On the other hand, the dependency problem discussed in this paper is shown in
the lower part of the figure. The relationship mainly involves parts suppliers in the U.S.
and Japan, who are exchanging or transferring dual-use technology. There is no legal
restriction on the exchange or transfer of these technologies, thus, no difference from
dealing with commercial technology in general.
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Therefore, due to the differences in the types of players, technologies involved,
and legal framework, it is necessary to distinguish these two layers to avoid confusion in
discussing military technical cooperation between the U.S. and Japan.
Ownership vs. Location
The first step in approaching the dependency problem is to examine the relative
importance of the nationality of a corporation's ownership and location of its facilities as
they relate to national security. This is because the internationalization of high-tech
industries tends to separate nationality of ownership from location of facilities.
Let's look at the case of the U.S. semiconductor industry. U.S. semiconductor
companies started to build their assembly plants abroad as early as the 1960s. Fairchild
first established a manufacturing affiliate for assembly in Hong Kong in 1961. Other
semiconductor manufacturers followed suit, looking for cheap labor, and established
assembly plants in Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. In the late 1960s, these locales
were expanded to include Mexico, and, in the 1970s, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Thailand and the Philippines. As a result, by the late 1970s, more than 80% of U.S.
semiconductors were being manufactured abroad.16
On the other hand, Japanese manufacturers are building semiconductor
production facilities in the U.S. The first, NEC, built full-line manufacturing facilities in
California and began volume production of DRAMs in 1985. Hitachi, Fujitsu and
Mitsubishi emulated NEC in the late 1980s, establishing similar manufacturing facilities
in the U.S. Although this move was partially in response to trade friction over
16
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semiconductors, which became particularly intense in the 1980s, Japanese companies'
production of semiconductors in the U.S. is steadily increasing.l7
Figure 3 shows an analysis of the problem of ownership vs location made by the
Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress.l 8 The figure displays four
different combinations of ownership and location of companies in terms of national
security. The best combination is obviously position (1), where corporations are largely
owned by U.S. interests and conduct their R&D and manufacturing operations
domestically. The U.S. was in this ideal position right after World War II. It became very
difficult, however, to maintain this position due to the internationalization of high-tech
industries and to the fact that the U.S. lost competitiveness in some of its high-tech
sectors. In short, it has become prohibitive for U.S. companies to manufacture
domestically all the components they need for high-tech weapons.
The worst case is position (4), where the location of both ownership and R&D
and manufacturing facilities is overseas. This situation is not acceptable for U.S. security.
Therefore, the U.S. is forced to make a choice between the better of two evils: position
(2), U.S. ownership with foreign R&D and manufacturing, and position (3), foreign
ownership with domestic R&D and manufacturing. The choice, thus, rests with which is
more important for U.S. national security, ownership or location.
The Office of Technology Assessment concluded that position (3) is preferable to
(2). This is because, in position (3), "the corporation and most of its employees would be
subject to the laws of the United States and could be required to give priority to U.S.
national security needs in a crisis." This situation is believed to be better than having to
17
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rely on supplies from manufacturing plants located overseas in a crisis, regardless of the
nationality of ownership. This conclusion by the OTA provides one important key to
solving the dependency problem.
IV. Policy Recommendations
Recommendation (1): Supplies from Japanese subsidiaries located in the U.S. and
localization of the subsidiaries
As the OTA assessment shows, the U.S. security position can be improved if
supplies of components made by Japanese manufacturers come from factories located in
the U.S. rather than in Japan. Japanese manufacturers, therefore, should supply
components from their U.S. factories if and when these components might be destined
for military applications.
There is an additional issue involved in supplying components from Japanese
manufacturers, i.e., assured access of Japanese supplies in a crisis. There is a doubt as to
whether Japanese subsidiaries would put priority on U.S. interests over their commercial
interests in U.S. military crisis.1 9
Localization of Japanese subsidiaries in the U.S. is necessary to remove this
doubt. In so doing, Japanese manufacturers could come to more closely resemble their
American counterparts and reduce the level of suspicion against them. Before R&D,
18
____ 
__1______ /-I·__IIII-CIICII IX·-
localization of production in the U.S. is desirable, and the local content of Japanese
products should be raised to the level of that in similar U.S. companies. This is because,
if Japanese subsidiaries in the U.S. rely on input supplies from Japan, U.S. vulnerability
towards Japanese manufacturers will increase, causing problems for U.S. security.
After local production is established, R&D should follow. If Japanese companies
establish R&D facilities in the U.S., this will be advantageous for U.S. security because
transfer of Japanese technology will likely take place and then the U.S. would have
easier access to that technology in a crisis.
It is also necessary for Japanese subsidiaries to localize their management.
Certain doubts about Japanese companies in the U.S. are based on how their
management would act in a crisis for the U.S. If the management positions of Japanese
subsidiaries are occupied mainly by Japanese nationals, this doubt becomes stronger.
And indeed, this is still the case. For example, an American Electronics Association
survey reported that, as of 1989, 98% of the top managers in Japanese electronics
companies in the U.S. were Japanese nationals. 20
If localization advances in terms of production, R&D and management and if
components to be used for military applications are supplied from U.S. subsidiaries, the
pacifism argument mentioned above cannot be supported. In other words, when critics
claim that Japanese components are used in high-tech weapons, it can be clearly argued
that those "Japanese" components are actually made by U.S. workers, managed by U.S.
managers, and made in U.S. factories using local materials. Such products can hardly be
called "Japanese" components.
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Recommendation (2): Keep the supply of truly critical military components within the
U.S.
For analytical purposes, it is necessary, first of all, to distinguish between two
types of military components. The first is a military-specific component that is truly
critical for weapons systems. The second is a general dual-use component. The
dependency problem with Japan lies in the latter, rather than the former.
U.S. vulnerability would not increase very much, even though the U.S. depends on
Japanese dual-use components, if Recommendation (1) is implemented from Japan's
side. If a problem in truly critical military-specific components arises, however,
vulnerability increases significantly, creating an unacceptable situation for U.S. security.
Therefore, it is important for U.S. companies to maintain production and assembly of
truly critical components within the U.S. Even if this involves moving these activities
back from Asia, it is important. Additionally, the U.S. government should implement
policies that would strengthen R&D capabilities in creating critical military components.
Such policy changes in funding and budgeting, R&D organizations, acquisition
procedures and education systems as suggested in various reports on military reform are
necessary to achieve this goal.21
Complexities arise, however, because the two types of components (military-
specific and dual-use) are not independent from one another; in fact, they are
technologically linked. This linkage did not cause problems when military technologies
were more advanced than commercial ones. This was the situation in the U.S. right after
20
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World War H when technology developed in the military market was spun off to the
commercial market. Under these circumstances, the U.S. could strengthen its military
technology by concentrating only on the development of military technology.
The situation since then, however, has changed due to the rapid pace of
technological development in the commercial market. Thus, today, some of the dual-use
technologies developed in the commercial market are more advanced than their
counterparts in the military market. As a result, these advanced dual-use technologies
have started to be spun off to military uses.
The manufacturing technology for semiconductors is a case in point. The
requirement for volume production in the commercial market made its manufacturing
technology increasingly refined and advanced. As a result, the military market could not
produce leading-edge components without the manufacturing technologies developed in
the commercial market. This means that, in order for critical military components to be
made in the U.S., the U.S. has to maintain leading-edge manufacturing technologies in
the commercial market.
This does not, however, lead to the argument that the U.S. dependence on dual-
use technologies is unacceptable for U.S. security. This problem caused by the linkage
between commercial and military technologies brings up my third recommendation, a
strategic alliance between U.S. and Japanese electronics companies.
21
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Recommendation (3): A strategic alliance
"Strategic alliance" refers to a management strategy to create a partnership with
another company in areas such as R&D, manufacturing, and marketing, and to cooperate
in business activities without merger or acquisition. There are various forms of strategic
alliances, including joint ventures, cooperative R&D, license agreements and alliances in
sales and marketing. Through these strategic alliances, companies try to obtain resources
in which they are lacking. My last recommendation is for U.S. and Japanese companies
to form strategic alliances with a view to solving the dependency problem.
Japanese dual-use technologies that are more advanced than those developed by
the U.S. military could be transferred to the U.S. through strategic alliances. For
instance, manufacturing technology could be transferred to the U.S. if U.S. and Japanese
companies form joint ventures and build manufacturing facilities in the U.S. In addition,
if appropriate mechanisms are established, it is also possible to transfer the technology
further to U.S. companies. In the automobile field, General Motors and Toyota have
formed a joint venture (NUMMI) and are now making cars in the U.S. mainly using
Japanese manufacturing technology. A similar kind of joint venture in the electronics
sector would make the same kind of transfer of dual-use technology to the U.S. possible.
In addition, cooperative R&D between U.S. and Japanese companies and
technology transfer from Japanese companies by licensing agreements should be
encouraged for the same reason.
22
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A U.S. alternative to the strategic alliance solution is to implement industrial
policy or cooperative R&D projects backed by the government to nurture critical dual-
use technologies. But this is probably a more expensive way to approach the problem. It
would appear easier and less costly to obtain the necessary technologies from those who
actually have them rather than carrying cooperative projects without them.
The industrial policy approach, however, places an additional burden on U.S.-
Japan relations. As already mentioned, Japan tends to be seen as a strong competitor,
even an enemy in extreme cases, in the political argument to push industrial policy. In
other words, it is the U.S. and Japanese companies that are actually competing with one
another. Industrial policy arguments, however, sometimes turn this competition into
competition between countries. This would, of course, increase tension between the U.S.
and Japan.
One of the major advantages of the strategic alliance approach is that it is a
market-driven solution to the problem and goes well with the trend towards the
globalization of industry. Even in the absence of national security considerations, a
number of strategic alliances among companies have already been formed. There are
economic and technological reasons for this: 1) R&D and capital investment has been
increasing rapidly in the high-tech sector, and one company alone cannot bear all the
expenses and risks of this; 2) due to the interdependence of various sectors of high
technology, one company alone cannot be competent in all the technical fields necessary
for the success of the business; 3) an alliance is a convenient step to set the technical
standards that are crucial for successful business operations in high-tech fields;
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4) companies can gain better access to foreign markets by forming alliances. I am
suggesting the addition of one more axis of national security in forming the strategic
alliance that would advance naturally by market forces.
If Japanese electronics companies become more sensitive to national security
issues and become active in transferring dual-use technologies to the U.S., Japan could
obtain such intangible benefits as less friction between the two countries over economic
security issues and, in turn, better U.S.-Japan relations. In addition, if transfer of
military-specific technologies from the U.S. becomes smoother as a result of successful
transfer of dual-use technology from Japan, this would surely serve Japan's national
interests.
Interrelated Economic and Security Problems
Historically, security problems between countries have been solved mainly through
governmental initiatives. The rapid pace of advancement in dual-use technologies,
however, is making this process more difficult. This is why the three recommendations
made here are aimed at private companies.
Symbolically, this shows that economic and security problems are increasingly
interrelated via technology. This means that it is now necessary for electronics companies
to be aware of the national security implications of their activities and be sensitive to
that. On the other hand, government should also be aware of the economic implications
of security policy. If national security considerations encourage the government to
24
intervene in private sector policy, the repercussions on the private sector would be more
significant than in the past and might hurt the healthy development of high-tech industry.
One additional implication of this study is that, due to the globalization of high-
tech industry, it is becoming very expensive for one country alone to solve national
security problems related to technologies. Thus, it is now important to cooperate with
allies, balancing the advantages of using one another's resources and the vulnerability
attached to reliance on them. This is one of the first steps to obtaining a high level of
national security at an affordable price.
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Figure 1 Relationship between Level of National SecuriLy and its
Economic Cost in terms of Elcctronics Technologies:
Cases for the U.S. and Japan
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Figure 2 Technological Relationship between the U.S. and Japan
in Military Field
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Figure 3 Military Dependence on Foreign Industry
Ownership v.s. Location
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